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Abstract—We design a novel artificial-noise-aided secure on-
off transmission scheme in a wiretap channel. We consider
a practical scenario where the multi-antenna transmitter only
obtains partial channel knowledge from the single-antenna re-
ceiver through limited training and feedback but has no channel
knowledge about the single-antenna eavesdropper. In the design,
we first propose a three-period block transmission protocol to
capture the practical training and quantization features. We
then characterize the statistics of the received signal-to-noise
ratios (SNRs) at the receiver and the eavesdropper. Under the
secrecy outage constraint, we exploit the on-off scheme to perform
secure transmission and derive a closed-form expression for the
secrecy throughput. Moreover, we investigate the optimization
problem of maximizing the secrecy throughput by proposing an
iterative algorithm to determine the optimal power allocation
between the information signal and artificial noise, as well as the
optimal codeword transmission rate. Furthermore, we define the
net secrecy throughput (NST) which takes the signaling overhead
into account and address the problem of optimally allocating the
block resource to the training and feedback overhead. Numerical
results clearly demonstrate how the optimal signaling overhead
changes with the number of transmit antennas, and there exists
an optimal number of antennas that maximizes the NST.
Index Terms—Secure transmission design, artificial noise,
training, feedback, net secrecy throughput.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE SECURITY issue of data transmission is an increas-ingly pressing concern in the design and development
of wireless applications, e.g., financial information, electronic
media, medical records, and customer files in the fifth gen-
eration (5G) network [1]. Indeed, the future wireless network
connecting millions of wireless devices would face serious and
persistent security threats if reliable security mechanism is not
established [2].
Traditional security is achieved based on the assumption that
the computational resources of the adversaries are insufficient
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to break specific public-key cryptography in polynomial time
[3]. However, it would be completely compromised when the
quantum computers of non-trivial size become reality. Against
this backdrop, the information-theoretic security approach has
been proposed and developed as a promising complement
to the cryptographic techniques. The seminal work in this
area can be traced back to [4] in 1975, which concluded
that perfect secrecy can be achieved at the physical layer
by taking channel impairments into account even when the
adversaries know the details of the codes employed. This con-
clusion has laid the foundation of the so-called physical layer
security and triggered numerous research studies to investigate
different physical layer methods for security enhancement.
Some exemplary methods are transmit beamforming [5–7],
antenna selection [8–10], cooperation techniques [11–13], and
artificial-noise-aided transmission [14–17].
A. Related Work
A common assumption adopted by the previous studies on
physical layer security is that the transmitter can obtain perfect
channel state information (CSI) of the legitimate receiver
and/or the eavesdropper. Such idealized conditions provide us
attractive advantages of the physical layer security. However,
due to the practical issues of training and channel feedback, it
is controversial to assume that the transmitter perfectly knows
the legitimate receiver’s channel, let alone the eavesdropper’s
channel [18]. For example, in practical frequency division du-
plex (FDD) systems, prior to data communication the receiver
first needs to estimate its channel by detecting the training
symbols emitted from the transmitter. Then a feedback link is
utilized for the receiver to convey the estimated CSI back to the
transmitter, which forms the closed-loop transmission. Since
the rate of the feedback link is usually limited, the receiver
has to quantize the estimated CSI before feeding it back. This
means that the accuracy of channel estimation and quantization
at the receiver affects the quality of the CSI at the transmitter
(CSIT). Due to this, considerable research efforts have been
devoted to designing practical secure transmission schemes by
considering imperfect CSIT caused by the practical training
and feedback issues.
Considering the imperfect channel estimation at receivers,
the optimal tradeoff between the energy used for training and
data signals was characterized for the multiple-input single-
output single-eavesdropper (MISOSE) wiretap channel in [19].
Moreover, the on-off mechanism was adopted to design an
practical transmission scheme in the presence of channel
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estimation errors [20]. On the other hand, considering the
scenario with limited feedback, [21] studied the secrecy outage
probability when the predefined codebook is known to both
transmitter and receiver. Focusing on the artificial-noise-aided
beamforming scheme, [22] and [23] optimized the transmis-
sion to guarantee secrecy with quantized channel feedback for
fast and slow fading channels, respectively. For block fading
channels, we note that dedicating a significant amount of
training and feedback overhead offers the high quality of CSIT,
but reduces the effective time resource used for data transmis-
sion [24, 25]. Motivated by this, [26] studied the non-trivial
tradeoff in wiretap channels, in which the effective ergodic
secrecy rate (ESR) was defined as the performance metric and
the maximization of the effective ESR was investigated. We
clarify that the ESR may not be an appropriate performance
metric in the system with stringent delay constraints. Actually,
outage-based characterizations, which measure systems with
probabilistic formulations, become more appropriate [27]. This
motives us to address the following problem in this paper:
“How to achieve the maximum net secrecy throughput (NST)
under the secrecy outage constraint in quasi-static block
fading channels?” Here, the NST is defined as the secrecy
throughput excluding the training and feedback overhead.
B. Our Contributions
In this paper, we focus on the MISOSE wiretap channel over
quasi-static block fading, where the communication between
a multi-antenna transmitter and a single-antenna legitimate
receiver is overheard by a single-antenna malicious eaves-
dropper. Importantly, we adopt a practical CSI assumption
that the transmitter only obtains the partial knowledge of
the transmitter-receiver channel through a finite amount of
training and feedback overhead. In contrast to the analog
feedback used in [26], in this work we adopt the digital (or
equivalently, quantized) feedback, which is due to the fact
that the digital feedback has a low complexity and offers a
substantial advantage over the analog feedback [24, 25].
In our considered wiretap channel where the instantaneous
knowledge of the transmitter-eavesdropper channel is not
available at the transmitter, the secrecy outage events will
inevitably happen. To guarantee a target security level, we
propose an artificial-noise-aided secure on-off transmission
scheme under the secrecy outage constraint1. We then derive
the closed-form expression for the secrecy throughput and
investigate the optimization problem of the secrecy through-
put maximization. Moreover, by adopting the NST as our
performance metric, we examine the optimum fraction of
resource that needs to be dedicated to the training and feedback
overhead. The key contributions of this paper are summarized
as follows:
1) We propose a practical three-period block transmission
protocol to help the transmitter obtain the legitimate
receiver’s CSI and perform secure transmission. The
1The on-off transmission scheme enables the transmitter to decide whether
or not to transmit according to the knowledge about the CSI of the transmitter-
receiver channel and/or the transmitter-eavesdropper channel. With this deci-
sion, the reliability and security performance can be enhanced [27, 28].
proposed protocol divides each block into three periods,
namely, the training period, the digital feedback period,
and the data transmission period. We clarify that this
protocol stands as a perfectly suitable solution to the
realistic system, e.g., the FDD system, since it captures
the essential system features.
2) We characterize new statistics of the received signal-to-
noise ratio (SNR) at the legitimate receiver under limited
training and feedback overhead. Such statistics enables
us to precisely characterize the secrecy throughput per-
formance. We state that the newly derived statistics has
never been presented in the literature, and serves as
a useful formula to examine the system performance
in similar applications, e.g., multi-user multi-antenna
communication with finite signaling overhead.
3) We develop new guidelines to determine the wiretap
code parameters for secure transmission, where the rate
redundancy is designed to keep the required security
level, and the codeword transmission rate is designed as
an constant parameter to optimize. Using this fixed-rate
encoding strategy, we derive the closed-form expression
for the secrecy throughput. Then we investigate the op-
timization problem of secrecy throughput maximization
and propose an iterative algorithm to find the optimal
power allocation ratio and codeword transmission rate.
4) We adopt the NST as a more appropriate secrecy per-
formance metric and examine the optimum fraction of
block resource allocated to the training symbols and
feedback bits. We numerically find that the optimal
fraction of the signaling overhead is approximately
proportional to the number of the transmit antennas.
We further find that increasing the number of actively
used transmit antennas does not always improve the
NST. Instead, there exists an optimal number of transmit
antennas that maximizes the NST. As such, when we
have enough transmit antennas, we need to carefully
determine a suitable number of antennas according to
the system parameters.
C. Organization
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section II, we provide an overview of the considered MISOSE
scenario. In Section III, we characterize the statistics of the
received SNRs. In Section IV, we design the transmission
scheme under secrecy outage constraint. In Section V, we use
the NST as a more practical metric to examine the optimum
fractional overhead. Finally, we present our numerical simu-
lations and main findings in Section VI and VII, respectively.
Notation: Matrices and column vectors are denoted by up-
percase and lowercase boldface letters. A circularly symmetric
complex Gaussian random variable z with variance 2 is
denoted as z  CN (0; 2). A Gamma-distributed random vari-
able x with parameters (a; b) is denoted as x  Gamma(a; b).
IN stands for an identity matrix of size N . ()y stands for
conjugate transpose operation. null() stands for spanning the
null space of matrix. j  j and k  k represent the norm of scalar
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS, ACCEPTED FOR PUBLICATION 3
h
g
Artificial
noise
Beamforming
Artificial
noise
Alice
Feedback link
Channel
EstimatorNo Feedback link
Quantization
?
?
Channel
Estimator
Bob
Eve
Fig. 1. A MISOSE wiretap channel with channel estimation error and limited
digital feedback.
and vector, respectively. log2() and ln() represent the base 2
logarithm and natural logarithm, respectively.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a MISOSE wiretap channel, as illustrated in
Fig. 1, where the transmitter, Alice, communicates with a de-
sired receiver, Bob, in the presence of a passive eavesdropper,
Eve. We assume that Alice is equipped with M antennas,
while Bob and Eve are equipped with a single antenna each.
Throughout this paper, we refer to the Alice-Bob link as the
main channel and the Alice-Eve link as the eavesdropper’s
channel. We also assume a quasi-static Rayleigh block fad-
ing model in this wiretap channel. Under this assumption,
the channel coefficients in the main and the eavesdropper’s
channels are independent identically distributed (i.i.d) complex
Gaussian random variables with zero mean and unit variance
across the coherence blocks. The channel coefficients hold
constant within a coherence block but vary independently from
block to block.
We denote hi as the channel coefficient between the i-th
transmit antenna at Alice and the received antenna at Bob,
where hi  CN (0; 1), such that the main channel vector is
expressed as h = [h1; h2;    ; hM ]. The received symbol at
Bob is written as
y = hx+ nb; (1)
where nb is the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) at Bob
with variance 2b , and x is the transmitted vector. Also, we
denote gi as the channel coefficient between the i-th transmit
antenna at Alice and the received antenna at Eve, where gi 
CN (0; 1). Correspondingly, the eavesdropper’s channel vector
is expressed as g = [g1; g2;    ; gM ]. As such, the received
symbol at Eve is written as
z = gx+ ne; (2)
where ne is the AWGN at Eve with variance 2e .
In this work, we consider that Alice is able to acquire partial
instantaneous knowledge about h sent from Bob through
a reverse link. However, since Eve usually performs as an
passive user (i.e., there is no reverse link between Alice and
Data Symbols
Feedback Bits
Training Symbols
T1 T2 TM TM+1 TM+2
Training Period Feedback Period Data Transmission Period
Scheduling Period
      T1 : Alice sends pilot symbols from her first transmit antenna;
      T2 : Alice sends pilot symbols from her second transmit antenna;
     TM  : Alice sends pilot symbols from her M-th transmit antenna;
  TM+1 : Bob conveys back the index of his quantized beamforming
             vector via a B-bit link;
  TM+2 : Alice performs secure data transmission to Bob.
Alice
Bob
??
Fig. 2. Scheduling period partition of a specific coherence block in the
proposed three-period block transmission protocol.
Eve), we consider that Alice cannot obtain any instantaneous
knowledge about g from Eve.
A. Partial Knowledge of the Main Channel
Due to the constrained resource for Alice’s CSI acquisition,
Alice typically learns about the partial knowledge of the main
channel through a finite amount of training and feedback
overhead. To characterize the imperfect CSI at Alice, we
propose a three-period block transmission protocol to capture
the essential features of the practical FDD system. In our
protocol, each block consists of a training period for a duration
of t, a feedback period for a duration of f , and a data
transmission period for a duration of d. If the coherence block
duration is c, we have the constraint
c = t + f + d: (3)
The scheduling period partition of a specific coherence block
is depicted in Fig. 2. Specifically, the first M time slots (i.e.,
from T1 to TM ) form the training period, the following time
slot (i.e., TM+1) forms the digital feedback period, and the
last time slot (i.e., TM+2) forms the data transmission period.
1) Channel Estimation: During the training period, the
transmitter sequentially scans the transmit antennas to transmit
T training symbols. To obtain a reliable estimation, the number
of training symbols needs to be no less than the number
of transmit antennas [26]. We assume that Bob computes
the linear MMSE estimation of h given the received vector
corresponding to T training symbols. Since the elements of h
are assumed to be complex i.i.d Gaussian random variables,
we have h = h^+m, where the estimated channel h^ and the es-
timated error m contain i.i.d complex Gaussian elements, sat-
isfying h^  CN  0; (1  2m)IM and m  CN  0; 2mIM,
respectively. According to [29], the variance of the estimation
error m can be written as
2m =
1
1 + bT=M
; (4)
where b = P=2b denotes the average SNR of the received
signal at Bob without estimation errors. Based on the estimated
channel information h^, Bob is able to obtain the channel direc-
tion information (CDI) of the main channel, i.e., d = h^=kh^k.
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2) CDI Quantization: After transmitting the training sym-
bols, Alice waits for Bob to convey B bits over a feedback
channel. The B bits specify the CDI associated with a particu-
lar beamforming vector. We clarify that Bob believes d as the
accurate CDI of the main channel, based on which Bob selects
the beamforming vector f from a quantization codebook V
formed by 2B unit-norm vectors, i.e., V = fv1;v2;    ;v2Bg.
Given V , Bob selects the SNR-maximizing beamforming vec-
tor, which yields
f = argmax
vi2V
jdvij2: (5)
Bob then feeds back the index of the selected beamforming
vector to Alice during time slot TM+1.
The optimization of the codebook V has been thoroughly
studied in [30, 31]. Albeit starting from different perspectives,
[30] and [31] concluded the same criterion for beamformer
design. In this criterion, a good codebook is the one which
minimizes the maximum correlation between any pair of
beamforming vectors. In this paper, we adopt the quantization
codebook generated by this criterion. Under this criterion, we
define cos2 = jdf j2, the cumulative distribution function
(CDF) of cos2 is approximated as
Fcos2 (x) =

0; 0  x < 1  "
1  2B(1  x)M 1; 1  "  x  1; (6)
where " = 2 
B
M 1 reflects the maximum error of the quanti-
zation at Bob.
B. Artificial-Noise-Aided Scheme
For the passive eavesdropping scenario, the instantaneous
eavesdropper’s channel knowledge is unknown to Alice, and in
this case a popular method to guarantee secure communication
is the artificial-noise-aided beamforming scheme adopted in
[14–16, 23, 32], which is outlined as follows. After receiving
the index of the selected beamformer f , Alice generates a
M M precoding matrix as W = [f ;F], where the columns
of F form an orthonormal basis for the null space of fy.
The M  1 transmitted symbol vector x at Alice is given
by x = fu + Fv, where u denotes the information-bearing
signal, and v represents the artificial noise. The variance of
u is Pu, and the M   1 elements of v are i.i.d complex
Gaussian random variables with zero mean and variance Pv .
We consider a transmit power constraint, denoted by P , where
P = Pu + (M   1)Pv . We denote the fraction of total power
allocated to the information signal as . Hence, the power of
the information-bearing signal and the artificial noise can be
written as Pu = P and Pv = P (1 )=(M 1), respectively.
In the following, we refer to  = PuPv =
M 1
 1 1 as the power
allocation ratio (PAR) between the information-bearing signal
and the artificial noise.
By applying this artificial-noise-aided beamforming design,
the received symbols at Bob and Eve become
y = h^fu+ h^Fv +mx+ nb; (7)
and
z = gfu+ gFv + ne; (8)
respectively. It is known that the perfect case corresponds to
f = h^y=kh^k, such that F = null(h^=kh^k) and h^F = 0.
In other words, under the perfect case the artificial noise
only confuses Eve without leaking into the main channel.
However, as described in Section II-A, this ideal scenario is not
realistic. Practically, since Alice only obtains Bob’s quantized
beamforming vector (i.e., f 6= h^y=kh^k), the artificial noise
that is originally intended to disrupt the Eve’s reception may
now leak into the main channel (i.e., h^F 6= 0), causing the
so-called noise leakage problem [22].
C. Wiretap Codes Design
We now determine the wiretap code parameters to achieve
a certain secrecy rate given by Rs = Rb   Re. Specifically,
we construct a parameter pair (Rb; Re) for the wiretap codes
[4], where Rb denotes the codeword transmission rate and Re
denotes the rate redundancy which provides secrecy against
eavesdropping. In this work, we adopt the fixed-rate encoding
strategy to reduce the complexity of practical application. That
is, Rb and Re hold constant over the transmission blocks.
The key challenge in our considered wiretap channel is how
to determine (Rb; Re) in the passive eavesdropping scenario.
In this work, we address this challenge as follows: We find
the smallest possible rate redundancy Re to guarantee the
security level of the system requirements; We find the optimal
Rb by formulating the closed-form expression for the secrecy
throughput and maximizing this performance metric.
III. STATISTICAL CHARACTERIZATION OF THE SNRS
In preparation for the design of secure transmission, in
this section we focus on characterizing the statistics of the
received SNRs at Bob and Eve. Specifically, by treating the
combination of the estimation noise and the thermal noise at
Bob as the worst-case Gaussian noise, we derive the statistics
of Bob’s received SNR. Also, by ignoring the estimation error
and thermal noise at Eve for a robust design, we present the
statistics of Eve’s received SNR.
A. The Received SNR at Bob
Since Bob has no knowledge of his channel estimation
error m, he is unable to perfectly determine his instantaneous
received SNR. Under this scenario, it is shown in [29] and
[33] that treating mx + nb in (7) as a zero-mean Gaussian
random variable n^b with variance 2b^ = 
2
m + 
2
b minimizes
the mutual information and therefore gives a lower bound on
the capacity with channel estimation and finite feedback bits.
By applying this method, we rewrite (7) as
y = h^fu+ h^Fv + n^b: (9)
Based on (9), the actual instantaneous SNR of the main
channel is given by
b =
ujh^f j2
vkh^Fk2 + 1
=
ukh^k2jdf j2
vkh^k2kdFk2 + 1
; (10)
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS, ACCEPTED FOR PUBLICATION 5
where u = Pu=2b^ and v = Pv=
2
b^
. Due to the fact that
jdf j2+kdFk2 = 1, we substitute jdf j2 = cos2 and kdFk2 =
sin2 into (10) and rewrite b as
b =
ukh^k2cos2
vkh^k2sin2 + 1
; (11)
where kh^k2 has a Gamma distribution2 with parameters
(M; 1   2m). For ease of notation, we define  = 1   2m
such that kh^k2  Gamma(M;). In the following, we aim to
derive the statistical distribution of b by applying the method
proposed in [34].
Lemma 1: We consider two independent Gamma random
variables X  Gamma(1; ) and Y  Gamma(M   1; )
and define U = "Y and V = X + (1   ")Y . We also define
I = kh^k2sin2 and S = kh^k2cos2. Under the quantization
cell approximation in (6), the joint distribution of (I; S) is the
same as that of (U; V ).
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix A.
Based on Lemma 1, we conclude that the interference term
vkh^k2sin2  Gamma(M   1; v"), and the received sig-
nal power ukh^k2cos2  Gamma(1; u)+Gamma(M  
1; u(1   ")). Note that the signal and interference are
correlated through Y .
Lemma 2: Aided by the random variables defined in Lemma
1, we rewrite b as
b =
uS
vI + 1
=
uX + u (1  ")Y
v"Y + 1
: (14)
Then, we derive the CDF of b as
Fb (x) =

1  e  xu M 1; x  0
FY ()  e  xu M 1F () ; x < 0; (15)
where  = "
 1
+x , 0 =
 
" 1   1,  = xu(1 ") v"x and
 has a Gamma distribution Gamma(M   1; ).
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix B.
In this work, we refer to b as the channel quality informa-
tion (CQI) of the main channel. It is worth mentioning that at
each transmission block, the instantaneous knowledge of b is
known at Bob. We state that Bob’s knowing b is significant
for our following transmission scheme design in Section IV.
B. The Received SNR at Eve
Since the estimation error and the thermal noise at Eve are
typically unknown to Alice, a robust approach needs to be
designed for the worst-case scenario. That is, we assume that
2A gamma distributed random X with parameters (M; ) is the sum of M
i.i.d. exponential random variables with  mean. The statistical distributions
of X are given by
fX (x) =
xM 1e x=
  (M) M
; (12)
FX (x) = 1 
M 1X
m=0
(x=)me x=
  (m+ 1)
: (13)
there is no thermal noise and no estimation error at Eve. As
such, the received signal at Eve is simplified as
z = gfu+ gFv: (16)
By doing so, the actual instantaneous SNR of the eavesdrop-
per’s channel is given by
e =
jgf j2Pu
kgFk2Pv
= 
jgf j2
kgFk2 : (17)
Since the unitary matrix W = [f ;F] is merely determined by
the CDI of the main channel, we state that W is independent
of g. This leads to the fact that the statistics of gW is the
same with g. That is, the entires of gW are i.i.d. Gaussian
random variables with zero mean and unit variance. Using [16,
Eq. (5)], the CDF of e is characterized as
Fe (x) = 1 

1 +
x

1 M
; (18)
which is merely determined by the number of the transmit
antenna M and the parameter . We clarify that (18) enables
us to investigate the secrecy performance without knowing the
average received SNR at Eve. The only required condition is
the Rayleigh fading environment. As such, (18) is especially
valid to the situation where there is no communication link
between Alice and Eve, e.g., Eve is a completely silent and
passive eavesdropper.
IV. SECURE TRANSMISSION DESIGN
In this section, we focus on designing the secure transmis-
sion scheme in the considered wiretap channel to guarantee
the secrecy performance against eavesdropping. Specifically,
we first characterize the secrecy outage performance and
determine the smallest rate redundancy given a secrecy outage
constraint. Then we adopt the on-off scheme to perform our
transmission design and facilitate the closed-form expression
for the secrecy throughput. Finally, we investigate the opti-
mization problem of maximizing the secrecy throughput with
fixed training and feedback overhead by proposing an iterative
algorithm to determine the optimal parameters.
A. Secrecy Outage Probability
For the passive eavesdropping scenario, the instantaneous
knowledge of e is difficult to be unveiled at Alice, and
thus the perfect secrecy is unavailable. In this scenario, the
secrecy outage probability is usually used to characterize the
security level from a probabilistic perspective [27, 35]. In
particular, the secrecy outage event occurs when the designed
rate redundancy Re is lower than the instantaneous capacity
of the eavesdropper’s channel, i.e., Ce = log2(1 + e).
Mathematically, for a given rate redundancy Re, the secrecy
outage probability is formulated as
pso = Pr fRe < Ceg = Pr

2Re   1 < e
	
: (19)
Using the CDF of e in (18), we derive pso as
pso =

1 +

2Re   1

1 M
: (20)
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To guarantee the security level of the system requirement,
we impose a secrecy outage constraint  in our transmission
design. Under the secrecy outage constraint pso  , the
minimum required rate redundancy is given by
Re;min = log2 (1 + th) ; (21)
where th = (
1
1 M   1).
B. On-Off Transmission Scheme
To ensure that a positive secrecy rate Rs is available, the
predetermined Rb needs to be always larger than Re;min. For
the convenience of following derivation, here, we denote Rb
as Rb = log2(1 + x), where x is a constant parameter and
needed to be optimally determined offline. The feasible region
of x is presented as follows: Firstly, Rb > Re;min implies
the fact that the condition x > th is needed. Secondly,
we add another condition x  0 on x for the following
reasons. Firstly, this condition enables us to perform further
mathematical analysis by using the CDF of b given by (15).
Secondly, we note that when B increases to some extent, the
performance gain resulting from increasing B tends to be
zero. Thus to efficiently take use of the feedback resource,
the size of B should be restricted. We also note that the
second condition x  0 becomes stricter as B increases. As
such, the second condition guarantees that a good throughput
performance can be obtained only when the predetermined B
is not too large (e.g., B < 10M )3.
In this work, we state that the optimization of x should sat-
isfy the above two conditions. Recall that 0 = (2
B
M 1   1)
and th = (
1
1 M   1), and we present the combined
condition on x by defining two interesting cases.
 Case 1 (Strong Security Requirement):   2 B . Under
this case, we have 0  th, such that we investigate the
design of x only when x satisfies
x > th: (22)
 Case 2 (Weak Security Requirement):  > 2 B . Under
this case, we have 0 > th, such that we investigate the
design of x only when x satisfies
x  0: (23)
From the design perspective, (22) and (23) imply that the
“on-off” transmission scheme with a threshold of x can be
adopted to perform our transmission design. Specifically, the
secure transmission is allowed only when the CQI known at
Bob (i.e., b) is larger than x. Using the CDF of b in (15),
the transmission probability is mathematically derived as
ptx = Prfb  xg = 2
BM 1e 
x
u
(+ x)
M 1 : (24)
It is worth mentioning that in addition to the B feedback bits
for CDI quantization, at each transmission block Bob also
3It is worth mentioning that since B is not large, the quantization error is
not very small. Under this case, if we set Pu < Pv (i.e.,  < 1), the noise
leakage problem is likely to grow far worse, seriously degrading the secrecy
performance. As such, in this work we only investigate the case of   1.
needs to convey back an extra bit identifying the on/off state of
the transmission. However, this 1-bit overhead is quite small
compared with the B bits for CDI quantization. Thus in this
work we omit this additional 1-bit to concentrate on the impact
of CDI quantization on the secrecy performance.
C. Secrecy Throughput Maximization
The aim of our transmission design is to achieve the
maximal secrecy throughput under the given secrecy outage
constraint. Here, the secrecy throughput is defined as [36]
 = ptx (1  ) (Rb  Re;min) : (25)
Notably, the secrecy throughput measures the average rate
of the transmitted message which is kept confidential to the
eavesdropper. Substituting (24) into (25), we formulate  as
 =
2B (1  )e  xu
(+ x)
M 1
1 M
log2

1 + x
1 + th

: (26)
To make our following analysis clear, here, we normalize the
noise power at Bob to 1, i.e., 2b = 1. By doing so, we have
2
b^
= 1+ 2m = 2  (1  2m) = 2 . As such, u = Pu=2b^
can be rewritten as u = P=(2   ). Moreover, since  =
(M   1)=( 1  1), we find that  = =(M   1+) and the
feasible region of  is [0;1). Based on these transformations,
we rewrite (26) as
 =
2B (1  )e  x(2 )(M 1+)P
(+ x)
M 1
1 M
log2

1 + x
1 + h()

; (27)
where h() = 
1
1 M   1. For the given training and feedback
overhead (i.e., T and B are fixed), we find that  is merely
a function of  and x. This motivates us to address the
following optimization problem:
Problem 1: Given the fixed T and B, what are the optimal
 and x that maximize the secrecy throughput under a given
secrecy outage constraint? This problem is mathematically
expressed as
max
;x
; ;
s.t.   1; x  0; x > th; (28)
where  is expressed in (27). In the following, we are going
to calculate the optimal values of  and x.
Due to the interaction between  and x, the above op-
timization problem is not directly intractable. As such, we
divide this joint optimization problem into two subproblems
and provide an iterative and mutual optimization algorithm
to handle it. In particular, we optimize  and x iteratively
according to the following sequence: [0] ! x[0] !    !
[n   1] ! x[n   1] ! [n] ! x[n] !    ! opt !
x;opt. This iterative process starts by initializing  and x. For
each iteration step n, we calculate the optimal [n] for a given
x[n 1] inherited from the last iteration, and then we calculate
the optimal x[n] with the fixed [n]. We repeat this process
until no further improvement on the secrecy throughput can
be obtained. Next, we present the two subproblems with their
solutions in the following.
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1) Optimal  for a Fixed x: By taking the first-order
derivative of  in (27) on , we derive @@ as
@
@
=
2B (1  )
ln 2
()J(); (29)
where () = 12 e
  xu ( +x )
M 1 ln

1+x
1+h()

and J() is
given by
J() =
(M   1) x
x + 
  h ()
2
1 + h ()
ln 1

1 + x
1 + h ()

+
x (2  ) (M   1)
P
: (30)
Since () is always positive, the sign of @@ follows that
of J(). As such, we are able to justify the monotonicity of
() by analyzing J(). However, since J() in (30) is still
complicated, we further take the first-order derivative of J()
and derive J
0
() as
J
0
()=
(M 1) 2x
(x+)
2  
0B@1 

1
1+h()
2
ln

1+x
1+h()
 +

1  11+h()
2
ln2

1+x
1+h()

1CA :
(31)
We find from (31) that J
0
() is a decreasing function of
. Next, we discuss the optimal  maximizing () for the
following two cases.
 Case 1:   2 B . This case is referred to as Strong
Security Requirement in Section IV-B, under which the
transmission condition is th < x, such that the feasible
region of  is [0; xh() ). Using (31) and (30), it is easy
to obtain that J
0
(0) > 0, J
0
( xh() ) < 0, J(0) > 0 and
J( xh() ) < 0. That is, J() first increases from a positive
value then decreases to a negative value as  increases.
As such, we conclude that () first increases and then
decreases as  increases. And the optimal  maximizing
() is the unique root of J() = 0.
 Case 2:  > 2 B . This case is referred to as Weak
Security Requirement in Section IV-B, under which the
transmission condition is 0  x, such that the feasible
region of  is [0; x& ], where & = 2
B
M 1   1. The optimal
 that maximizes () depends on the sign of J
0
(x& )
and J(x& ): 1) If J
0
(x& )  0, the optimal  is x& ; 2) If
J
0
(x& ) < 0 and J(
x
& )  0, the optimal  is x& ; 3) If
J
0
(x& ) < 0 and J(
x
& ) < 0, the optimal  is the unique
root of J() = 0.
Based on the above discussions, we present the optimal x
maximizing  with a fixed  in the following theorem.
Theorem 1: For a fixed x, the optimal  maximizing  is
 = maxf; 1g; (32)
where
 =
8>><>>:
?;   2 B ;
?;  > 2 B ; J
0
(x& ) < 0; J(
x
& ) < 0
x
& ;  > 2
 B; J
0
(x& ) < 0; J(
x
& )  0
x
& ;  > 2
 B; J
0
(x& )  0;
(33)
and ? satisfies
0 =
(M   1) x?
x + ?
  h () (
?)2
1 + h ()?
ln 1

1 + x
1 + h ()?

+
x (2  ) (M   1)
P
: (34)
We state that although we are not able to derive an explicit
expression for ?, we can efficiently calculate it through the
binary search method.
2) Optimal x for a Fixed : By taking the first-order
derivative of  on x, we derive @@x as
@
@x
=
2B(1  )
ln 2
M 1e 
x
u
(+ x)
M
K(x); (35)
where
K(x) =
+ x
1 + x
 

M   1 + + x
u

ln

1 + x
1 + th

:
(36)
It is easy to find that the sign of @@x follows that of K(x).
In other words, we can examine the monotonicity of (x)
by examine the sign of K(x). We find from (36) that
limx!1K (x) =  1 and K(x) is a decreasing function
of x when   1 is satisfied. Next, we discuss the optimal
x maximizing (x) for the following two cases.
 Case 1:   2 B . Under this case, the feasible region
of x is (th;1). Since K(th) > 0, we conclude that
K(x) becomes first positive and then negative as x
increases. As such, the optimal x maximizing (x) is
the unique root of K(x) = 0.
 Case 2:  > 2 B . Under this case, the feasible region
of x is [0;1), and the monotonicity of (x) depends
on the sign of K(0). In particular, if K(0)  0, (x)
monotonically decreases with x, such that the maximum
is achieved at x = 0. However, if K(0) > 0,
(x) first increases and then decreases with x, and the
maximum is achieved at the unique root of K(x) = 0.
Now, we present the optimal x maximizing  with a fixed
 in the following theorem.
Theorem 2: For a fixed , the optimal x maximizing  is
x =
8<: 
?;   2 B ;
?;  > 2 B;K (0) > 0;
0;  > 2
 B ;K (0)  0;
(37)
where ? satisfies
+ ?
1 + ?
 

M   1 + + 
?
u

ln

1 + ?
1 + th

= 0: (38)
Also, the explicit expression for ? is difficult to derive, and
we still adopt the binary search method to calculate it.
By summarizing the above analysis to the two subproblems,
we present the detailed process to obtain the solutions for
Problem 1 in Algorithm 1. As indicated in [26], this two-step
iterative algorithm can converge fast to a stationary point of
the optimization problem in (28). The proof is not provided in
this article, and readers may refer to [26] for detailed process.
Here, we highlight that this algorithm is an efficient method
to deal with Problem 1, which can be observed in Section VI.
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Algorithm 1 Proposed Iterative Algorithm for Solving the
Problem in (28).
1: Initialization: n = 1, [1] = 1, x[1] = 1, ([0]; x[0]) =
0 and  > 0.
2: Calculate ([1]; x[1]).
3: While j([n]; x[n])  ([n  1]; x[n  1])j   do
4: n = n+ 1;
5: Given x[n  1], find the optimal [n] using (32);
6: Given [n], find the optimal x[n] using (37);
7: Calculate the secrecy throughput ([n]; x[n]);
8: end while
9: Output: [n] and x[n].
V. NET SECRECY THROUGHPUT
In this section, we focus on a new secrecy performance
metric, referred to as the NST. We attribute this metric to
the non-trivial tradeoff between CSI acquisition and data
transmission in block fading channels with a fixed coherence
time. In such channels, a large amount of training and feedback
overhead improves the CSI quality but reduces the time spent
on data transmission, while a small amount of training and
feedback overhead leads to a poor CSI quality, which in turn
decreases the achievable secrecy throughput. Motivated by this
fact, in this section we adopt the NST as the primary secrecy
performance metric and determine the optimum training and
feedback overhead maximizing the NST.
A. NST as a New Secrecy Performance Metric
Recall the analysis in Section II-A, the signaling overhead
for channel acquisition (i.e., T and B) consumes t+ f time
resource and only c   t   f resource is used to transmit
D data symbols. Based on this signaling overhead model, we
define the NST as a closed-form expression given by
net =

1  t + f
c

; (39)
where  is the secrecy throughput defined in (25). Here, we
assume that both Alice and Bob use the same rate (i.e., r) to
transmit the forward and feedback signals, such that t = T=r
and f = B=r, where  is a conversion factor relating bits
to symbols. Substituting t and f into (39), we rewrite the
NST as
net =

1  T + B
L

; (40)
where L = rc is the symbol size of each coherence block.
B. NST Maximization
Apart from the closed-form expression for the NST indi-
cated by (40), one may also want to know the optimal system
parameters that maximize the NST for a given block size. This
motivates us to investigate the following optimization problem:
Problem 2: Given the coherence block length L, what
are the optimal T , B,  and x that maximize the NST
under a given secrecy outage constraint? This problem is
mathematically expressed as
max
T;B;;x
net;
s.t. T + B +D = L;
  1; x  0; x > th; (41)
where net is expressed in (40).
Recall that in Section IV-C, we have investigated the Prob-
lem 1 and presented the algorithm to find the optimal  and
x maximizing the secrecy throughput under the given T and
B. That is, if we fix the values of T and B, we are able
to obtain the optimal  and x maximizing  by applying
Algorithm 1. Moreover, we find from (40) that for fixed T
and B, the optimal  and x maximizing net are equivalent
to the optimal  and x maximizing . As such, Problem 2
can be transformed to the following optimization problem.
Problem 3: Given the coherence block length L, what are
the optimal T and B that maximize the NST under a given
secrecy outage constraint? This problem is mathematically
expressed as
max
T;B

1  T + B
L

 (opt; x;opt) ;
s.t. T + B +D = L; (42)
where opt and x;opt are the solutions of Problem 1. It is
worth to mentioning that the values of opt and x;opt vary
with the change of T and B. That is, opt and x;opt are the
functions of T and B, but these two function relationships
(i.e., opt(T;B) and x;opt(T;B)) are implicit.
We clarify that Problem 3 is a typical non-linear integer pro-
gramming (NLIP) problem. The implicit relationships between
(opt; x;opt) and (T;B) substantially increase the difficulties
in solving this problem. According to the literature, there are
only a few effective algorithms to practically solve it. The most
popular ones are the heuristic search algorithm and the explicit
enumeration method (EEM) [37]. The heuristic search algo-
rithm is particularly useful to produce sub-optimal solutions
to large-scale NLIP problems. However, it lacks the ability to
obtain globally optimal solutions. Differing from the heuristic
search algorithm, the EEM is known for its implementation
simplicity in solving small-scale NLIP problems. Specifically,
it can reliably provide the global optimal solutions to such
problems with acceptable complexity.
Fortunately, we find that there are only two variables in the
solution space of our optimization problem given by (42). This
implies that the scale of our target problem is quite small. As
such, we directly apply the easy-to-implement EEM to solve
(42) in an efficient way. As per the rules of the EEM, we
detail the process of obtaining the EEM solutions for (42) in
Algorithm 2.
It is worth mentioning that the complexity of Algorithm 2 is
O(L2). This means that its complexity is in general acceptable
since the typical block length is not very large. We also point
out that the efficiency of Algorithm 2 can be greatly improved
by reducing the search space. Specifically, when B > 10M ,
the transmission threshold becomes very large (i.e., ptx is quite
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Algorithm 2 Proposed EEM for Solving the Problem in (42).
1: Initialization: net;max = 0, Topt = 0 and Bopt = 0.
2: Global search:
3: for T = fM;M + 1;    ; (L  1)g do
4: for B = fM;M + 1;    ; (L  T )=g do
5: Find opt and x;opt by applying Algorithm 1.
6: Compute net =

1  T+BL

 (opt; x;opt).
7: if net > net;max do
8: Update net;max = net, Topt = T and Bopt = B.
9: end
10: end
11: end
12: Output: Topt and Bopt.
small), leading to the fact that the secrecy throughput is almost
zero. Moreover, if the length of signaling overhead accounts
for more than half of the whole block, the secrecy throughput
performance will be degraded seriously.
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we present some simulation results to char-
acterize the secrecy performance of our designed transmission
scheme. Firstly, we validate the accuracy level of our theoret-
ical analysis with Mento Carlo simulations. Then we examine
the secrecy throughput performance and the convergence of
Algorithm 1. Finally, the optimal signaling overhead that
maximizes the net secrecy throughput is characterized.
A. Verification of Theoretical Accuracy
In Section II-A, the approximated CDF of the quantization
error was introduced for our theoretical analysis. This indicates
that the derived expressions in our work are approximated
results. Therefore, we first need to characterize the accuracy
level of this approximation.
Fig. 3 plots the approximated secrecy throughput versus P
for different values of B, along which the numerical secrecy
throughput is provided using Monte Carlo simulation. The
numerical points marked by ‘’ are averaged over 10,000
channel trials, and the quantization codebook is generated
based on the design criterion in [30, 31]. It is seen from this
figure that the difference between the approximated  and
the numerical  is extremely minor. This indicates that the
quantization approximation has an almost negligible effect on
the secrecy throughput, such that the closed-form expression
derived in (26) can accurately predict the secrecy throughput
with limited training and feedback. Since the derivations in
this work are based on the expression of secrecy throughput in
(26), we state that Fig. 3 verifies the accuracy of our theoretical
analysis in this work.
B. The Optimal  and x Maximizing Secrecy Throughput
In this subsection, we first examine the optimal  and x
that maximize the secrecy throughput under fixed T and B by
applying Algorithm 1, and then we study the convergence of
this algorithm.
5 10 15 200
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
P (dB)
η
Approximate η
Numerical η
B = 6
B = 5
B = 4
Fig. 3. Secrecy throughput versus P for different values of B with M = 4,
T = 4,  = 0:1,  = 4 and x = 15.
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0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
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η
δ = 0.04
δ = 0.03
δ = 0.02
δ = 0.01
Fig. 4. Secrecy throughput versus  for different values of  with M = 4,
P = 100, T = 4, B = 6 and x = 15.
Fig. 4 plots the secrecy throughput versus  for different
values of  with a fixed x = 15. We first observe that
strengthening the secrecy outage constraint (i.e., reducing )
decreases the secrecy throughput. We further observe that
the optimal  maximizing  depends on the value of . In
particular, if  is small (e.g.,  = 0:01; 0:02; 0:03),  first
increases and then decreases as  increases, and the optimal 
is the solution of @=@ = 0; while if  becomes larger (e.g.,
 = 0:04),  monotonically increases with the increasing of
, such that the optimal  is at the right boundary.
Fig. 5 plots the secrecy throughput versus x for different
values of  with a fixed  = 4. In this figure, we observe
that the optimal x maximizing  depends on the value of .
Specifically, if  is small (e.g.,  = 0:01; 0:02; 0:03),  first
increases and then decreases as x increases, and the optimal
x is the solution of @=@x = 0; while if  is large (e.g.,  =
0:04),  monotonically decreases with the increasing of x,
such that the optimal x is at the left boundary. We highlight
that the observations in Fig. 4 and 5 verify the correctness of
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Fig. 5. Secrecy throughput versus x for different values of  with M = 4,
P = 100, T = 4, B = 6 and  = 4.
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Fig. 6. Achievable secrecy throughput versus  for different values of M
with P = 100, T = 8, B = 8 and  = 0:01.
our analysis in Section IV-C.
Fig. 6 plots the achievable secrecy throughput versus  for
different values of M with fixed T and B. The achievable
secrecy throughput is achieved by applying Algorithm 1 to
determine the optimal  and x. We first observe that for
a fixed M , the achievable secrecy throughput first increases
then decreases as  increases. That is, allowing for a certain
degree of secrecy outage can indeed obtain an larger secrecy
throughput, but bigger outage is not always better. We further
observe that for a fixed , increasing the number of transmit
antenna reduces the achievable secrecy throughput. This is not
surprising since when M increases, the number of the training
symbols and feedback bits for each transmit antenna decreases,
such that the CSI quality obtained at Bob becomes worse and
the secrecy performance is degraded.
Fig. 7 and 8 plot the convergence of Algorithm 1 with
 = 10 6 for two kinds of cases. In particular, Fig. 7 is
for the case of Strong Security Requirement (i.e.,   2 B),
and Fig. 8 is for the case of Weak Secrecy Requirement (i.e.,
1 5 10 15 20 25 30 350.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
n (Iteration step)
η
δ = 0.06
δ = 0.05
δ = 0.04
Fig. 7. The convergence of Algorithm 1 with M = 4, P = 100, T = 4,
B = 4 and  = 10 6.
1 1.5 2 2.5 30.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
n (Iteration step)
η
δ = 0.06
δ = 0.05
δ = 0.04
Fig. 8. The convergence of Algorithm 1 with M = 4, P = 100, T = 4,
B = 6 and  = 10 6.
 > 2 B). We observe that when   2 B , the convergence
speed of Algorithm 1 depends on the value of . For example,
when  = 0:04, Algorithm 1 converges under 13 iterative
steps; While when  = 0:06, this number is 33. Although the
needed iterative steps are different, they are generally smaller
than 50 and thus the convergence speed is acceptable. On
the other hand, when  > 2 B , Algorithm 1 converges to
a stationary point within only 3 iterative steps. This is due to
the fact under this case, the boundary points are the optimal
solutions, such that the algorithm can be converged quickly.
These observations highlight that Algorithm 1 is an efficient
algorithm to solve Problem 1.
C. The Optimal Fraction of Overhead Maximizing NST
In this subsection, we numerically characterize the optimal
fraction of the signaling overhead, (Topt + Bopt)=L, maxi-
mizing the NST. To clarify, in the following we only consider
BPSK feedback at Bob such that we have  = 1 [29].
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Fig. 9. Optimal overhead fraction versus M for different values of  with
P = 100 and L = 200.
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Fig. 10. Achievable net secrecy throughput versus M for different values of
L with P = 100 and  = 0:05.
Fig. 9 plots the optimal fraction of the signaling overhead
versus M for different values of . In this figure, the optimal
signaling overhead is obtained by applying Algorithm 2. We
first observe that the stronger the secrecy outage constraint, the
more signaling overhead is needed. We further observe that
the optimal overhead fraction is approximately proportional
to M . This phenomenon can be explained as follows: To
ensure Bob to acquire a satisfactory CSI quality, the signaling
overhead averaged on each transmit antenna should not be
reduced. Thus when M increases, the total signaling overhead
should increase in proportion to M . Moreover, we find that
this proportional factor is insensitive to the changes of .
Fig. 10 plots the achievable NST versus M for different
values of L. Firstly, we observe that the achievable NST first
increases then decreases as M increases. This phenomenon
demonstrates that for a given L, the number of transmit
antennas is not the more the better. Instead, there exists an
optimal M that maximizes the NST. We also observe that the
optimal M shifts to right when L increases. For example, we
find that when L increases from 200 to 400, the optimal M
grows from 7 to 9. Moreover, we observe that increasing L
would increase the achievable NST, as one may expect. This
figure highlights that the number of actively used transmit
antennas needs to be determined according to the length of
the coherence block. In particular, when there are plenty of
transmit antennas available at Alice, we can merely exploit a
a suitable number of them to achieve the maximum NST.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we investigated the design of secure trans-
mission scheme in the MISOSE wiretap channel with limited
training and feedback overhead. Assuming that Alice has the
partial knowledge of the main channel but no knowledge of
the eavesdropper’s channel, we designed an artificial-noise-
aided secure on-off transmission scheme under the secrecy
outage constraint. Then we studied the problem of how to
obtain the maximum secrecy throughput under fixed training
and feedback overhead, based on which we further studied
the problem how to optimally allocate the block resource to
the signaling overhead. We numerically found that it is not
always best that using all transmit antennas to perform secure
transmission under limited signaling overhead.
To extend this work, it is of interest to consider the adaptive-
rate encoding strategy for secure transmission design with
limited signaling overhead. Further, in this work the scenario
where Eve is equipped with multiple antennas has not been
taken into consideration, which is also an important research
direction of our future work.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
Firstly, we derive the joint distribution of (I; S), which is
related to that of (kh^k2; sin2) by the transformation
fI;S (u; v) = kJ1kfkh^k2;sin2 (r; w) : (43)
Since u = rw and v = r(1   w), we have r = u + v and
w = uu+v . Thus the Jacobian J1 is given by
J1 =
@ (r; w)
@ (u; v)
=

1 1
v
(u+v)2
 u
(u+v)2

; (44)
and kJ1k = 1u+v . Since kh^k and d are independent with each
other, it follows that kh^k2 and sin2 are independent. As such,
the joint distribution of (I; S) is formulated as
fI;S (u; v) =
1
u+ v
fkh^k2 (u+ v) fsin2

u
u+ v

; (45)
Note that kh^k2  Gamma(M;) and the CDF of sin2 is
given by
Fsin2 (x) =

2BxM 1; 0  x  "
1; "  x  1: (46)
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As such, we have
fI;S (u; v)
=
1
u+ v
fkh^k2 (u+ v) fsin2

u
u+ v

=
1
u+ v
(u+ v)
M 1
e 
u+v

  (M)M
2B (M   1)

u
u+ v
M 2
=
2BuM 2
  (M   1)M e
 u+v ; 0  u
u+ v
 ": (47)
Now consider two independent Gamma random variables
X  Gamma(1; ) and Y  Gamma(M   1; ) and define
U = "Y and V = X + (1  ")Y . We would like to show that
the joint distribution (U; V ) is also given by (47).
In particular, the joint distribution of (U; V ) is related to
that of (X;Y ) by the transformation
fU;V (u; v) = kJ2kfX;Y (x; y) : (48)
Since u = "y and v = x+(1 ")y, we have x =  1  1"u+ v
and y = u" . Thus the Jacobian J2 is given by
J2 =
@ (x; y)
@ (u; v)
=

1  1" 1
1
" 0

(49)
and kJ2k = 1" . Therefore, we derive the joint distribution of
(U; V ) as
fU;V (u; v) =
1
"
fX

1  1
"

u+ v

fY

1
"
u

=
1
"
1

e 
(1  1" )u+v

(u/")
M 2
e 
u
"
  (M   1)M 1
=
2BuM 2
  (M   1)M e
 u+v : (50)
To guarantee that
 
1  1"

u + v  0 always holds true, the
condition 0  uu+v  " is necessary.
Through comparing the results of (47) and (50), we con-
clude that the joint distribution of (U; V ) is the same as that
of (I; S).
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
The CDF of b is formulated as
Fb(t) = Pr fb  tg = Pr

uX + u (1  ")Y
1 + v"Y
 t

:
(51)
To obtain the closed-form expression for Fb(t), we discuss
the following two cases.
Case 1: When t   " 1   1, tu +v"tu + "  1 y  0
holds true for any y  0, and thus Pr fb  tg is derived as
Pr f  tg
=
Z 1
0
Pr

X  t (1 + v"y)
u
  (1  ") y

fY (y) dy
=
Z 1
0
FX

t
u
+

v"t
u
+ "  1

y

fY (y) dy
= 1 
Z 1
0
e 
1
 (
t
u
+( v"tu +" 1)y) y
M 2e y/
  (M   1)M 1 dy
= 1  e  tu
Z 1
0
yM 2
  (M   1)M 1 e
  (vt+u)"yu dy
= 1  e  tu

u
v"t+ u"
M 1

Z 1
0
yM 2e 
(vt+u)"y
u
  (M   1)

u
v"t+u"
M 1 dy
| {z }
=1
= 1  e  tu M 1; (52)
where  = uv"t+u" =
" 1
t+ .
Case 2: When 0  t <  " 1   1, we need to
restrict the condition y  tu(1 ") v"t to guarantee that
t
u
+

v"t
u
+ "  1

y  0. Under this case, we define
 = tu(1 ") v"t and derive Pr fb  tg as
Pr fb  tg
=
Z 
0
Pr

X  t (1 + v"y)
u
  (1  ") y

fY (y) dy
=
Z 
0
FX

t
u
+

v"t
u
+ "  1

y

fY (y) dy
= FY () 
Z 
0
e 
1
 (
t
u
+( v"tu +" 1)y) y
M 2e y/
  (M   1)M 1 dy
= FY ()  e  tu M 1
Z 
0
yM 2e 
y

  (M   1) ()M 1
dy
= FY ()  e  tu M 1F () ; (53)
where  has a Gamma distribution Gamma(M   1; ).
The results obtained in (52) and (53) are summarized in
Lemma 2.
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